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     My thesis in this paper is a fairly simple one, and one, I believe, that is fairly simple to 
support on rational grounds – although I imagine it will prove controversial among some 
dedicated to a strictly ‘scientific’ understanding of life. But the thesis can be stated simply 
enough: A materialist interpretation of evolutionary theory cannot account for the subjective 
dimension of life, and, in particular, cannot account for that aspect of life of most concern to 
religion, its spiritual aspirations. Indeed, not only can it not account for desire of a spiritual sort, 
it cannot account for desire at all, not even the desire for physical survival, which it presupposes.  
When we analyze evolutionary theory with care we discover, somewhat astonishingly, that it 
actually contravenes the philosophy of metaphysical materialism. A full recognition of this 
undermines the claims of evolutionary materialists such as Daniel Dennett, Richard Dawkins and 
others, who have advanced and popularized the notion that the truth of evolutionary theory 
implies the falsity of religious belief.   
     But before considering my thesis let me first of all clarify it. I want to be quick to say that 
when I speak of the limits of evolutionary explanation I do not mean this in the sense in which 
Michael Behe and other intelligent design theorists say that natural selection cannot account for 
irreducible complexity. The ID theorists maintain that it is implausible to assert that irreducibly 
complex organic systems result from natural selection, as each element of the system would need 
to be selected for independently. This is a more or less straightforward logical argument based 
upon a key premise of natural selection theory; that only that which bestows survival advantage 
is selected for. If, say the ID theorists, the elements of an irreducibly complex system do not each 
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bestow a survival advantage then the logic of natural selection itself implies that they cannot 
have resulted from it. On this basis it is argued that such systems must be accounted for by 
something else; in particular, some deliberately acting intelligence. This is the basic argument of 
ID theory. 
     Evolutionists answer by denying that there are, in fact, ‘irreducibly’ complex systems. They 
maintain that the examples of  irreducible complexity provided by ID theorists can indeed be 
shown to be reducible to elements that would have bestowed survival advantage when they first 
appeared. In some cases this can be demonstrated more or less directly, in others, say the 
evolutionists, it is reasonable to assume it on the basis of the general success of natural selection 
theory itself. In other words, the evolutionists claim that the explanatory gaps ID theorists 
profess to find in natural selection theory simply do not exist.  
     My argument differs from this. It does not seek to demonstrate gaps in the explanatory power 
of evolutionary theory, but to show that evolution’s explanations do not reach as far as the 
evolutionary materialists (e.g., Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett,  E. O. Wilson, Richard 
Lewontin, etc.) suggest. Indeed, I maintain that a careful consideration of natural selection theory  
itself calls into question the assumptions of metaphysical materialism. To see this, however, we 
will need to attend closely to the logic of natural selection theory.  
     That logic is straightforward and can be expressed simply: In order for a trait to be ‘selected 
for’ it must meet two criteria: 1. It must exist. It must be present in some entity. Nothing can be 
selected for that does not already exist. 2. It must be such as to bestow a survival advantage on 
the entity that possesses it. 
     Criterion 1 alone is sufficient to indicate the explanatory limits of natural selection theory. 
This theory is often said to be a theory of origins (of course, Darwin’s revolutionary work was 
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entitled The Origin of the Species), but in fact natural selection as such does not explain the 
‘origin’ of anything. Given that only traits that already exist can be selected for, the origin of 
those traits must be attributed to something other than selection. This is obvious enough, and 
would be uncontroversial if it were not for the way that evolutionary theorists often slip into a 
casual, teleological, mode of speaking; as if this or that trait were intentionally produced by 
natural selection for the purpose of fulfilling this or that survival aim.
1
 Of course, the 
evolutionists themselves understand this to be a shorthand, and scientifically sloppy, way of 
speaking. It is, however, more than sloppy; it is misleading. It involves the logical blunder of 
mistaking an effect for a cause.  
     According to natural selection theory, survival advantage is the effect of traits that are then 
selected for because they have that effect. The giraffe’s long neck, for instance, is not produced 
in order for the giraffe to reach the high leaves, rather the giraffe is able to reach the high leaves 
because it has a long neck. What then is the origin of the long neck? Natural selection theory 
cannot answer this question. Evolutionary theory in general answers ‘random mutation.’ But 
what kind of an ‘origin’ is this? What is ‘random mutation’? 
     Mutation simply means change. Of course, in order for something to change, randomly or 
otherwise, it must first of all exist, and in two distinct ways. The medium that undergoes the 
mutation must exist as the substratum of mutation, and that into which that medium changes 
must exist in potentia as a real possibility of that substratum.  
     For example, in order for the gene that determines the length of the giraffe’s neck to mutate 
into a gene that produces a longer neck, that gene must, first of all, already exist, and, second of 
all, must have the potential to mutate in just the way it does. Of course it is entirely possible, 
logically, that genes in general would not have that particular potential. Even more to the point, 
4 
 
neither the existence of genes nor their potentialities have their ‘origin’ in random mutation. The 
term ‘random mutation’ describes a process; it tells us nothing of the origin of that which 
undergoes the process. It does not answer the question of how the universe comes to be a place 
that makes possible such genes. Carefully considered, then, neither the theory of natural selection 
nor the theory of random mutation provide insight into the origin of living traits and processes.    
     These two ideas – natural selection and random mutation – constitute the core of Darwinian 
evolutionary theory. Neither provide an explanation of the origin of living entities. Thus, 
evolutionary theory is not actually a theory of ‘origins’ at all. It describes processes, but yields 
no insight into the origin of that which undergoes these processes. It describes how, it does not 
explain wherefrom. But it is this latter that we would need to understand if we wanted to assess 
the meaning and purposes of life.    
     At this point, however, we can hear the evolutionary theorist object. The question 
evolutionary theory answers is why organic systems have the functional organization they do. 
Before Darwin, this organization was thought to be the work of a supreme intelligence who 
crafted these systems in just these ways for a divinely ordained purpose. After Darwin, we were 
better able to explain this organization as a function of strictly natural, i.e., material, processes. 
So, the evolutionist says, Darwin’s theory does indeed explain what was unexplained, or poorly 
explained, before, and does so through appeal to strictly natural, i.e., material, processes. 
     True enough. But a great deal hangs on just what we are to understand by the word ‘explain.’ 
What is explained by Darwinian theory is the manner in which living systems become organized. 
What remains unexplained is the ultimate nature of these living systems.  It is this nature we 
must understand if we are to assess the ultimate potentialities of life. And it is these potentialities 
we must understand in order to assess the rationality of the religious impulse. Evolutionary 
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theory does not address this. For sure, the evolutionary materialists contend that evolutionary 
theory implies that the nature of life will be (or can be) understood in entirely material terms. 
Were this true it would indeed undermine most religious interpretations of the meaning of life. 
My contention, however, is that evolutionary theory implies no such thing; indeed, it implies the 
opposite. We can see this most clearly by applying our analysis of the limitations of evolutionary 
explanation to the non-material, subjective, features of life we are familiar with through 
introspection.  
     It is a commonplace in evolutionary discourse to speak of the ‘competition for,’ or ‘struggle 
for,’ survival. Given the intensive struggle for survival we see among living systems, we are told, 
only those that are well adapted to the conditions of survival can persist from generation to 
generation. Those less well adapted fall by the wayside. This is the logic that drives natural 
selection. What is seldom noted with respect to this discourse, however, is that the very use of 
the term ’struggle for survival’ takes us beyond the conceptual bounds of metaphysical 
materialism. Material systems as such may affect one another, but they do not struggle with one 
another. The word ‘struggle’ implies intentionality and purpose. A ‘struggle for survival’ implies 
a desire to survive. We have immediate knowledge of the existence of such desire, for we 
experience it within ourselves. What is its origin? How has it arisen? What is its essential nature 
and ultimate thrust? As we’ve already noted, evolutionary theory cannot answer these questions. 
     But, given the sloppy way in which evolutionary theory is often expressed, even by those who 
know better, it behooves us to put a finer point on this. Surely the desire to survive is selected 
for, some might say. Those who have a desire to survive are much more likely to behave in ways 
that will further their survival than those who do not, hence the desire to survive confers a clear 
survival advantage. True enough (although the implications of this are not at all what the 
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materialists might suppose, as we shall see in a moment). But, again, to suppose that this 
explains the desire to survive is to mistake an effect for a cause. The survival advantage 
conferred by the desire to survive is an effect of that desire, not its cause. The selection that then 
takes place is the effect of the survival advantage. The cause of the desire is not at all given by 
natural selection theory. It is not even addressed by it. Nor, for reasons stated above, does the 
idea of ‘random mutation’ provide a causal explanation. The origin of this desire is a pure 
mystery.  
     More broadly, the origin of the subjective in general is a pure mystery. No insight into this is 
provided by evolutionary theory. No one has, or can, explain the mechanism through which a 
material gene, however randomly mutated, results in thinking, feeling, caring, hoping, loving, 
etc. Neither the origin nor ultimate nature of these subjective states are given by evolutionary 
theory. True enough, evolutionary theory tells us that if subjective states are traceable to our 
genetic structure, then those states will be subject to selective pressures. But this tells us nothing 
at all of their origin or ultimate nature. Nor does it shed any light on how the subjective can 
emerge from the material.  
     As some will note, this is simply the mind-body problem considered in the context of 
evolutionary theory.  My point in bringing it up in this context is simply to indicate that 
evolutionary theory in no way resolves it.  This again highlights the limits of evolutionary 
explanation, and in a particularly striking way. After all, what we are subjectively, is what we are 
most intimately and immediately. Our subjectivity is our immediate presence to ourselves. 
Without it, we would scarcely be us. If we wish to understand our origin and ultimate nature, 
then, it is the origin of this subjectivity we must understand. Evolutionary theory provides no 
insight into this. 
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     But we can take this point a step further. Indeed, we can turn the materialist argument 
altogether on its head. How, we might ask, can the desire to survive – a subjective state – confer 
a physical survival advantage? It can do so only by affecting physical behavior. The natural 
selection argument in this instance goes something like this: animals who desire survival are, for 
that reason, more likely to act in ways that further survival than those who do not. Hence, they 
are more likely to be winners in the struggle for survival. Thus, the desire for survival is 
‘selected for.’ But this will only be true to the extent that desire – again, a subjective state – can 
have physical efficacy. Somehow this mind-state must be able to reach into matter, the matter of 
an animal’s body, and affect its behavior. To the extent that we were to understand evolutionary 
theory as grounded in, or as implying, metaphysical materialism, this would make no sense. How 
can a mere subjective state physically move a material body?  On materialist grounds it cannot. 
This leads us to a startling conclusion: In order for the desire to survive to have any bearing on  
natural selection at all, metaphysical materialism must be wrong.  
     We can flesh this out by examining what we are calling the ‘desire for survival’ in closer 
detail. It might be pointed out that the phrase ‘desire for survival’ is an abstraction. In fact, we 
don’t desire ‘survival’ per se, but the furtherance of pleasurable states and the avoidance of 
painful states. It just happens that natural selection associates pleasure with survival promoting 
behavior and pain with survival threatening behavior. If the opposite were the case we would 
desire our demise. Fair enough. But how are we to understand how such an association occurs? 
In order for the subjective states of pleasure and pain to become associated by natural selection 
with survival relevant behavior, those states must have the power to induce such survival 
relevant behavior. After all, it is behavior that is either selected for or selected out by tending to 
promote or undermine survival. If subjective states couldn’t affect behavior they would have no 
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bearing on selection. But how, on materialist grounds, can subjective states modify physical 
behavior?  
     What we would expect, on materialist assumptions, is that there would be no subjective states 
at all. Of course we know this not to be the case. In the face of the undeniable fact of subjective 
states, then, materialism maintains that these states are mere ‘epiphenomena,’ i.e., irrelevant to 
the causal nexus of the material world. But this is just what natural selection shows is not the 
case. If subjective states were irrelevant to material causality they would have no correlation 
with survival relevant behavior. We would expect a random distribution of these states, and 
expect them to have no affect on, or association with, behavior.  
     But we do not find a random distribution of subjective states, but rather that positive, i.e., 
desirable, states are, by and large, associated with survival promoting behavior and negative 
states with survival threatening behavior. Again, this could only result from natural selection if 
these states can reach into the physical world and change it. But if they can, then this means the 
subjective – i.e., the non-material – must have physical efficacy. This altogether contravenes the 
assumptions of materialism. 
     The materialist would likely counter that these states are not merely subjective, but have 
material counterparts in the brain or nervous system. Neurological study leaves little doubt that 
this is so. On this basis, the materialist would argue that it is not the subjective quality of the state 
that affects physical behavior but its material, neurological, counterpart. This would allow all 
causality to remain on the material plane. Fair enough. But then how account for the fact that 
these subjective states have just these subjective qualities? Why, for instance, does the material 
counterpart of pleasure feel good subjectively? Why does pain, or the physical counterpart of 
pain, hurt? The materialist can give no plausible explanation for this. If everything results from 
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strictly material interactions to which the quality of subjective states is irrelevant, then the 
subjective qualities of pleasure and pain would have no efficacy. Not only would there be no 
need for these subjective qualities to be as they are, but, even more to the point, we could find no 
plausible explanation for how these qualities come to be  associated with physical states and 
physical behavior relevant to survival.  Can it be a mere coincidence that sticking a hand in a fire 
hurts, or that sexual activity feels good? Such a suggestion strains credulity.  
     The natural selection argument must be that the subjective quality of hurt is selected for 
because this subjective quality itself induces beneficial avoidance behavior. But, again, this 
means that the hurt itself, that is, the subjective quality of hurt, must be able to somehow reach 
into the physical and modify it. It must somehow be able to cause (or induce) our bodies to 
behave in certain ways. Only to the extent that this is the case does it make sense to believe that 
natural selection favors an association of hurt with avoidance behavior.  
     But if this is so then the materialist thesis that reality, or, at least, all that is efficacious in 
reality, has a material basis, must be wrong. We arrive at the astonishing conclusion that 
evolutionary theory, far from favoring a materialist metaphysic, actually undermines it, by 
indicating that the subjective has causal efficacy in the material world. This suggests that the 
subjective – consciousness – cannot be a mere byproduct or ‘epiphnomenon’ of matter.  
     What then is it? Where does it come from? What is its essential nature? Evolutionary theory 
does not – indeed cannot – answer these questions.  
     Of particular relevance to religion is the question of what potentialities the subjective has. 
Can it exist only in association with the material world as we know it, or might there be 
subjective domains of reality that do not have or require a material basis or association? Nothing 
in evolutionary theory yields an answer to this question. Are the values that arise from   
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subjective desire, of which the value we place on physical survival is one, restricted to values 
that promote physical survival, or might the valuation of physical survival be but one aspect of a 
broader teleological trajectory, inherent to the subjective as such, that would find its ultimate 
consummation in what the religious person calls ‘communion with God’?   
     Again, given that evolutionary theory tells us nothing about the origin of the subjective, and 
hence nothing of its ultimate nature or thrust, it provides no answer to this question. In order for 
living systems to survive over generations they must engage in behavior that will effectively pass 
their genes along, and (to the extent that our subjective valuations have physical efficacy)  this 
implies that behaviors that do will tend to be valued. But this in no way suggests that these are 
the only values inherent to the subjective.    
     The materialist might point out that we have evidence for Darwinian evolution and the 
‘struggle for survival’ it suggests, but no evidence (other than the subjective testimonies of the 
faithful) for a religious teleology. But such a point would only be relevant to the extent that 
belief in the former contradicted belief in the latter, such that we had to choose between them. 
The point of my essay is to indicate that it does not.  Does evolution raise difficulties for 
theology insofar as it highlights the dog-eat-dog (or animal-eat-animal) structure of the natural 
world, a structure, some might think, inconsistent with belief in a loving God? Perhaps, but then 
we did not need Darwin to point out this aspect of nature to us. Isaiah was aware long ago that, in 
the world we occupy, the wolf does not lie down with the lamb (except to eat it!). What in 
theology is called the ‘problem of evil,’ both natural and moral, has long been a difficulty for 
religion. Faith demands the ability to believe that this problem is not finally fatal to the 
rationality of theism. This is certainly a subject worthy of consideration, but it is a subject we 
will have to leave for another time.  
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     In closing, I wish to make clear, again, that what I have presented here is no ‘God-of-the-
gaps’ argument. What is at issue is whether evolutionary theory makes it unreasonable to believe 
that human life, at its core, is characterized by a teleology that finds its true consummation in 
some version of ‘communion with God.’ This is suggested by evolutionary materialists such as 
Dawkins and Dennett. My argument is not that they are mistaken because evolutionary theory is 
wrong or incomplete (as the ID theorists maintain), but that they are mistaken because  
evolutionary theory does not have the implications they suppose. In particular, it does not 
preclude the possibility of a ‘spiritual’ teleology. Indeed, when we consider evolution’s own 
recognition that life ‘struggles’ for survival – a struggle manifest in the subjective desire for 
survival – we see that it actually presupposes a teleological dimension to life.  
     My claim is that there is nothing in evolutionary theory that would require us to believe that 
life’s teleology is fully expressed in the pursuit of terrestrial survival. What evolution highlights 
is that terrestrial life includes this pursuit (something, of course, we already knew), but it neither 
proves nor implies that it is wholly defined by it.   
     Let us suppose, then, as a thought experiment, that some form of theism is right.  What would 
we expect to see? We would expect to see the emergence of some creature whose desires are 
indeed favorable to terrestrial survival (otherwise the creature would not survive) but not wholly 
satisfied with such survival – a creature straining for something beyond mere material, terrestrial, 
goods, in ways that yield no obvious selective advantage. I maintain that this is just what we do 
see in the human struggle for beauty, truth, justice, and the spiritual in general. In this way 
religion serves as some evidence for its own validity. The human spirit aspires to more than mere 
material continuance. The suggestion on the part of evolutionary materialists that it does not – 
that, indeed, it cannot – lies at the heart of the hostility many religious people feel toward 
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evolutionary theory. But when we separate evolutionary theory from the philosophy of 
metaphysical materialism it is often used, or misused, to promote, we see that there is no need for 
such hostility. The truth of evolutionary theory is consistent with a fully informed and rational 
spiritual faith.  
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
        
 
                                                             
1 Among the most flagrant examples of this sloppy mode of speaking is the title of Richard Dawkins’ popular 
bestseller, The Selfish Gene. The word ‘selfish’ suggests an intentionality that is contrary to the actual logic of 
evolutionary theory  
